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Refusing to Expand Asylum Law: An Appropriate Response
by the Fourth Circuit in Niang v. Gonzales
INTRODUCTION
Mame Fatou Niang's denial of relief from removal, in Niang v.
Gonzales,1 illustrates the difficulties that arise at the intersection of
U.S. asylum law2 and the controversial practice of female genital
mutilation ("FGM"). FGM is the term given to a set of surgical and
quasi-surgical operations that remove all or part of the external
female genitalia and are performed on girls and women mainly in
Africa and Asia.' U.S. asylum law, as it relates to the practice of
FGM, functions properly to meet only the needs of those aliens who
may actually face persecution in their home countries. In Niang v.
Gonzales, Niang based her claim for withholding of removal on the
possible threat of FGM to her daughter, a U.S. citizen.4 Because
Niang herself would not face FGM and her daughter, as a citizen, was
permitted to remain in the United States, Niang's claim of
persecution lacked a firm legal foundation, and she was thus denied
relief.' The decision of the Niang court placed Maine Fatou Niang in
the difficult position of choosing between leaving her daughter
behind in the United States with a father who might take her to
1. 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007).
2. In the interest of clarity, this Recent Development uses the term "asylum law" to
collectively refer to all claims made by aliens seeking relief from deportation, including
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
3. See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Abankwah v. INS,
185 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1999)).
4. Niang, 492 F.3d at 507-08. If Niang herself faced FGM, "it is well-settled" that it
would qualify as persecution strong enough to support a grant of asylum. Abebe v.
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). But because Niang's claim was based on
the threat of FGM to her U.S. citizen daughter, the court was faced with a different
question altogether.
5. Niang, 492 F.3d at 509 (noting that the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
affirmed the immigration judge's denial of relief to Niang); id. at 514 ("[Tlhe state of the
law and the contents of this record require that we affirm the BIA.") (emphasis added).
The circuit courts review BIA findings of fact under a "substantial evidence" standard. Id.
at 510. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, with deference given to BIA
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and its associated regulations. Id.
at 515 (Williams, J., dissenting in part). Judge Williams dissented in part because she
believed the majority did not afford enough deference to previous BIA interpretations of
the term "persecution" that might have justified Niang's asylum claims. Id. at 516.
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Senegal and have FGM performed on her,6 or taking her daughter to
Senegal where FGM might still be performed.7 Despite the heart-
wrenching nature of this individual case, the Fourth Circuit's decision
was a proper application of asylum law. Asylum law, as it currently
stands in the United States, appropriately reserves asylum and
withholding of removal for those aliens who truly need protection
from inevitable and actual persecution in their native countries.
Although this Recent Development focuses on Niang's claim for
withholding, the general argument that claims for relief from removal
should remain limited under applicable law applies equally to claims
for asylum. Withholding of removal does not provide as broad a
protection for the applicant as asylum and only protects against
removal to the specific country or countries to which withholding is
granted.8 This piece argues, however, that Niang's arguments-if
made in the context of an asylum claim-should also be rejected.
This Recent Development specifically addresses why Niang's
argument to expand the definition of "persecution" to include fear of
pure psychological harm was inappropriate as a matter of law. Next,
it responds to the Niang dissent's argument that pure psychological
harm can rise to the level of torture necessary to support a
persecution claim. Reflecting on the growth of derivative asylum in
response to China's harsh population control measures, this Recent
Development then explains why Niang's argument to apply derivative
asylum to FGM cases was properly rejected by the Fourth Circuit.
This Recent Development concludes that current asylum law
appropriately limits relief to aliens threatened with actual harm and,
as a result, may ultimately best serve the humanitarian goal of
reducing FGM worldwide.
I. NIANG V. GONZALES
Mame Fatou Niang, a native and citizen of Senegal, entered the
United States on a non-immigrant visa in August 2000.1 She
remained in the United States after her visa expired on November 8,
2000.10 Eight months later, Niang gave birth to her daughter." Two
6. Id. at 508.
7. Id. at 507.
8. Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Removal-A Brief Overview of the
Substantive Law, 1659 PLI/CORP 305, 331 (2008). For example, if Niang had been granted
withholding of removal, she could not be deported to Senegal, but may have been
deported to another nation.
9. Niang, 492 F.3d at 507.
10. Id.
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years later, in October 2003, the Department of Homeland Security
initiated proceedings for removal.1 2 Niang conceded removability but
argued multiple grounds for relief, including withholding of
removal. 3 The Fourth Circuit reviewed Niang's case and resolved
two arguments Niang made to support her claim for withholding of
removal. Niang argued that: (i) she should be granted withholding
because she would suffer persecution based on the psychological
harm resulting from her daughter being subjected to FGM in Senegal,
and (ii) she should be granted withholding on a "derivative" claim
based on the persecution her daughter would face in Senegal if
subjected to FGM. 14 Both of these arguments were based on the
presumption that Niang's citizen daughter would accompany Niang to
Senegal if Niang was deported. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
psychological harm alone did not establish a sufficient basis to
support Niang's first claim of persecution.1 5 Regarding the derivative
claim, the Fourth Circuit concluded that statutes and regulations did
not authorize Niang's claim for withholding based on the threat of
FGM to her U.S. citizen daughter.16
Denied relief by the Fourth Circuit, Niang faced the unenviable
decision of either leaving her daughter with the child's father in the
United States or taking her daughter to Senegal where FGM might be
performed. Asylum law requires this decision because "the statutory
language [of the Immigration and Nationality Act] does not provide a
derivative claim to parents of U.S. citizens"17 and because, at least in
the Fourth Circuit, claims of fear of psychological harm do not meet
11. Id.
12. Id. at 508.
13. Id. Niang's case made its way from an immigration judge to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, both of whom rejected Niang's claims and ordered her removed.
Id. at 509. "Withholding of removal" is the descriptor given to the U.S. implementation of
the 1951 United Nations Convention Related to the Status of Refugees under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)(3) and requires an applicant to establish that she is a refugee by showing a
"clear probability of persecution" (i.e., that persecution is "more likely than not").
Hughes, supra note 8, at 330-31.
14. Niang, 492 F.3d at 509-10. Niang also made a claim for relief from removal based
on protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") but did not appeal the
BIA's rejection of this claim to the Fourth Circuit, and thus waived it. Id. at 508, 510 n.5.
15. Id. at 512.
16. Id. at 513.
17. Id. at 512 n.l. The Fourth Circuit further notes that "[tlhis omission may be
intended to 'prevent wholesale circumvention of the immigration laws by persons who
enter the country illegally and promptly have children to avoid deportation.' "Id. (quoting
Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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the standard for statutory persecution necessary for a withholding
claim to succeed. 18
Niang, however, is not the first alien parent faced with such a
heart-wrenching decision under current asylum law. Between 2002
and 2005, fourteen cases dealing with the issue of parents claiming
relief based on the threat of FGM to their daughters were heard by
seven circuits, 9 with only the Sixth Circuit granting asylum in the case
of Abay v. Ashcroft.2' Abay seems to be in a class by itself in
recognizing parental asylum claims based on the threat of FGM to
daughters.2 1  For example, in the representative case of Oforji v.
Ashcroft,22 the Seventh Circuit held that the mother of two U.S.
citizen daughters could not successfully claim derivative asylum or
withholding of removal based on a threat of FGM to her daughters.23
The Seventh Circuit specifically noted that Congress had foreseen the
"difficult choices" the current law places before illegal aliens, but
upheld the law as Congress intended. 24 Although one might look to
this state of the law and try to construe statutes to allow these families
to stay in the United States25 or argue for legislative action to make
families claiming FGM threats able to stay,26 a closer look at the law
18. Id. at 512.
19. Kimberly S. Blizzard, Note, A Parent's Predicament: Theories of Relief for
Deportable Parents of Children Who Face Female Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
899, 900 & n.3 (2006).
20. 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004). See infra text accompanying notes 29-37 for a
discussion of Abay v. Ashcroft.
21. Abay, 368 F.3d at 645-46 (Sutton, J., concurring) (reviewing case law and noting
that "[c]ircuit court precedent does not advance [the derivative asylum] claim ...
particularly in the absence of testimony that the child effectively would be deported
alongside the parent"). Note that while Judge Sutton characterizes the mother's claim as
derivative asylum, id. at 645, the majority views the "issue ... [as] whether Abay can seek
asylum in her own right based on a fear that her child will be subjected to female genital
mutilation." Id. at 641 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Claims of derivative asylum
based on the child's status and claims of parental asylum based on fear of psychological
harm can thus overlap. Niang's claim of derivative asylum is discussed more thoroughly in
Part IV, infra.
22. 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003).
23. Id. at 619.
24. Id. at 618.
25. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 515-17 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that psychological harm alone may satisfy the requirement of
"persecution" for a claim of withholding of removal and the case should therefore be
remanded to the BIA to resolve the issue); Alida Yvonne Lasker, Note, Solomon's
Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 231,
267 (2006) ("[T]here is ample authority in the law to suggest that the silence in the INA
can be read to allow for the extension of derivative asylum to parents, or, in the
alternative, that Congress should amend the INA.").
26. Blizzard, supra note 19, at 922-23; Lasker, supra note 25, at 267.
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surrounding FGM and immigration indicates that clear standards
denying relief in such cases are appropriate.
II. FEAR OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PERSECUTION
An applicant asserting a claim for withholding of removal must
demonstrate "a 'clear probability' that she will face persecution in the
country of removal" in order to succeed.27 Niang first argued that the
psychological harm of having her daughter subjected to FGM should
be the type of persecution able to support a withholding claim.2" But,
as noted earlier, Abay v. Ashcroft is the only case that has granted a
parent's claim for asylum based on the fear that a daughter would be
subjected to FGM in the parent's native country.29 In Abay, the Sixth
Circuit held that an alien mother could successfully claim asylum-
demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution-based on
the fear that her daughter would be forced to suffer FGM.3 ° The
Sixth Circuit, based on three administrative adjudications that
granted asylum or withholding to parents of citizen daughters facing
FGM, found a "governing principle in favor of refugee status in cases
where a parent and protector is faced with exposing her child to the
clear risk of being subjected against her will to a practice that is a
form of physical torture causing grave and permanent harm."31
Although most cases based on psychological harm alone cannot
support a claim for persecution,32 Abay and the dissenting judge's
27. Niang, 492 F.3d at 510 (quoting Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 324 n.13 (4th Cir.
2002)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006) ("[T]he Attorney General may not remove an
alien to a country if ... the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of [his] ... membership in a particular social group .... "); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
(2007) (implementing regulations for 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
28. Niang, 492 F.3d at 511. Niang's claim was limited to withholding of removal
because her asylum claim was "untimely." Id. at 509. The standard for withholding of
removal is higher than the standard for an asylum claim. Id. (citing Camara v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004)).
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004). Note that Abay involved an
asylum claim where the standard is a "well-founded fear of future persecution," id. at 636-
37, while the Niang case, as noted, involved a withholding of removal claim where the
standard is a "clear probability" of persecution. Niang, 492 F.3d at 510. This means that
Niang faced a tougher standard than the immigrant in A bay.
31. Abay, 368 F.3d at 642.
32. See, e.g., Niang, 492 F.3d at 512 (rejecting Niang's psychological harm argument);
Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that psychological damage
suffered by daughter who witnessed her father's four arrests and was pushed to the ground
by a police officer did not rise to the level of persecution necessary to support an asylum
claim).
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opinion in Niang33 suggest that there is some small amount of legal
traction for such an argument; however, even among some who argue
for an expansion of asylum law to support alien families facing FGM
in their home countries, the holding of Abay is controversial.34 The
Niang majority decision exemplifies this critique by distinguishing
Abay as the "only federal decision permitting a parent to seek relief
... based solely on the psychological suffering she will endure if her
daughter will be subjected to FGM upon removal. '35  The Fourth
Circuit went on to strongly assert that psychological harm alone
simply cannot qualify as "persecution."36 The Niang court viewed the
Abay holding that psychological harm could constitute persecution as
gratuitously extending the statutory definition of persecution.37 In
short, the Fourth Circuit in Niang accused the Sixth Circuit in Abay
of legislating from the bench.
In addition to its tenuous treatment before the courts in cases
involving parents of potential FGM victims, the classification of
psychological harm as "persecution" runs contrary to the Board of
Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") construction of the term as "harm or
suffering ... inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for
possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor sought to
33. Niang, 492 F.3d at 517 (Williams, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the BIA's
failure to address the argument that the psychological harm to Niang was "persecution"
required a remand). Judge Williams cited the BIA case of In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec.
915 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc), to support the argument that psychological harm might
constitute persecution. Niang, 492 F.3d at 516. In re C-Y-Z- involved a husband's
successful claim of persecution based on the forced sterilization of his wife. 21 I. & N.
Dec. at 915. Despite Judge Williams' argument to the contrary, this case is best handled as
a claim of derivative asylum. See infra text accompanying notes 82-92.
34. Blizzard, supra note 19, at 911-12; Wes Henricksen, Note, Abay v. Ashcroft: The
Sixth Circuit's Baseless Expansion of INA Section 101(a)(42)(A) Revealed a Gap in
Asylum Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 477, 502-03 (2005) ("[D]ecisions such as Abay v. Ashcroft
... purport to expand the law but provide no solid basis on which to do so. A more
desirable alternative would be for Congress to amend INA § 208(b)(3)(A) to include
parents of asylees.").
35. Niang, 492 F.3d at 512. The Fourth Circuit also distinguished Abay on the
grounds that the daughter in that case was not a U.S. citizen and thus, unlike Niang's
citizen daughter, could not stay in the United States. Id. This mode of distinguishing
Abay is arguably flawed, as it seems the Fourth Circuit, faced with the Abay facts, would
grant asylum to the alien daughter who faced the actual physical threat of FGM and deny
it to the mother who only faced a fear of psychological harm. See infra notes 54-57 and
accompanying text. But see Niang, 492 F.3d at 514 n.13 (noting that, in some
circumstances, an asylum claim of parents fearing an FGM threat to a daughter might
succeed).
36. Niang, 492 F.3d at 512.
37. Id.
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overcome." 38  Such harm or suffering must be inflicted by a
government or individuals or groups that a government is not able or
willing to control.39 However, social groups, not governments, tend to
be the perpetrators of FGM.4" For example, in Senegal the
government has criminalized FGM and has established educational
programs,41 which suggests that the government is working against
FGM persecution by the social groups that perform it.42 Because
FGM is a cultural practice,43 it strains logic to argue that the
community women performing the act" are somehow punishing and
persecuting the parents for a belief that FGM is wrong for their
children. Rather, it seems that FGM is performed to satisfy cultural
superstitions about possible harms that the female genitalia pose to
children or male sexual partners45 and for reasons relating to chastity
or purity. 46 FGM is not about persecuting parents.
Outside of the FGM context, the treatment of psychological
harm as a source of the persecution necessary to support an asylum or
withholding claim indicates that claims based solely on psychological
harm are likely to fail. For example, in Mashiri v. Ashcroft,47 an
entire family of Afghanis living in Germany was threatened and
harassed by individuals and groups strongly opposed to foreigners,
with violence perpetrated against the father and the two sons.48 In
Mashiri, the mother, Zakia Mashiri, was granted asylum based on
strong proof of past persecution which gave rise to a legal
"presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution" necessary
38. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added). This
matter dealt with an adult citizen of El Salvador who alleged death threats and assaults
from El Salvadoran guerrillas. Id. at 218. He was not granted asylum or withholding of
removal. Id. at 237.
39. Id. at 222.
40. See, e.g., Niang, 492 F.3d at 508-09 (discussing the practice of FGM in Senegal and
noting that the Senegalese government has made FGM a crime).
41. Id. (citing 2003 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRAcTICES FOR SENEGAL (Feb. 25, 2004)).
42. This author does not have clear data that the law criminalizing FGM is enforced
by the Senagalese government, but is assuming that this law is enforced to an adequate
extent.
43. Blizzard, supra note 19, at 901.
44. Id.
45. See Adam Liptak, Drawing a Line Between Enduring Harm and Legitimate Fear,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A18 (referencing a 2001 State Department report detailing
tribal beliefs in Mali that contact between a baby and the clitoris during birth could kill the
baby and that poison secreted from the clitoris could kill a man if it touched his penis).
46. See World Health Org., Female Genital Mutilation, May 2008,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/index.html.
47. 383 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 1115-17.
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to satisfy the requirements for asylum.49 The Ninth Circuit opinion in
Mashiri noted that, "[p]ersecution may be emotional or psychological,
as well as physical."5 But the facts of Mashiri indicate that Mashiri
not only suffered the psychological harm of witnessing her husband
and sons' abuse, but was also herself almost caught and beaten by an
anti-foreigner mob and threatened with death.' In other words, the
Mashiri court stated in dicta that persecution may be purely
emotional or psychological,52 but actually held that the cumulative
harm to Mashiri, emotional, psychological, and physical, rose to the
level of persecution.53
Niang attempted to base her claim of persecution on the
psychological harm she would suffer if her daughter was subjected to
FGM in Senegal.54 Although a non-United States citizen girl or
woman in the position of Niang's daughter could successfully claim
persecution based on the actual physical threat of FGM and be
granted withholding of removal,55 Niang herself could not base a
claim solely on the psychological harm resulting from FGM being
performed on her daughter,56 despite Abay's indication otherwise. As
49. Id. at 1119; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining "refugee"). Niang
herself may have been able to make a claim for asylum based on past persecution for the
FGM she was subjected to as a child. See Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 509 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2007). However, such a claim was not made by Niang in her appeal before the Fourth
Circuit, id., and is beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
50. Mashiri, 383 F.3d at 1120.
51. Id. at 1116-17.
52. Id. at 1120.
53. Id. at 1121. Several courts have noted the need to consider harms cumulatively.
See, e.g., Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
persecution is determined based on a cumulative view of events); Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d
1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) ("When considering an asylum claim, we consider
cumulatively the harm an applicant has suffered."). Notably, neither of these courts
included psychological harm in the analysis of cumulative harms suffered.
54. Niang, 492 F.3d at 511. Under current asylum law, parents can neither claim
derivative asylum based on the asylee status of their children, see Abay v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2004), nor, as previously noted, claim derivative asylum if their
children are U.S. citizens. Niang, 492 F.3d at 512 n.11; see also supra note 17 and
accompanying text. Niang likely claimed her potential psychological harm qualified as
persecution in order to circumvent this statutory bar. Niang also argued that she should
be granted derivative withholding of removal. See discussion infra Part IV. The
"psychological harm" claim was arguably more likely to succeed because it only required
the court to interpret the statutory term "persecution" in Niang's favor, while the
derivative withholding claim would have required the court to judicially amend the
statute.
55. Niang, 492 F.3d at 510 ("FGM constitutes 'persecution' within the meaning of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. ). Niang's daughter, as a U.S. citizen, would not
need to make such a claim.
56. Id. at 512. Niang could have made a strong asylum or withholding claim based on
the possibility that FGM would be performed on her again. See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d
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the Fourth Circuit held, " 'persecution' cannot be based on a fear of
psychological harm alone."57 This decision appropriately limits relief
from removal to aliens facing more than pure psychological harm in
their home countries.
The Niang majority's holding that the psychological harm of
having a daughter subjected to FGM cannot itself constitute
persecution is consistent with most other circuits that have decided
cases involving parents of potential FGM victims.58 Mashiri, a case in
which the entire family was persecuted, and where the mother herself
was threatened with death and beatings, simply indicates that
psychological harm in combination with actual or threatened physical
harm can rise to the level of persecution.59 Psychological harm alone,
especially in the FGM context, does not rise to the level of
persecution necessary to support a withholding or asylum claim.
III. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND NIANG'S CLAIM OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSECUTION
Judge Williams' partial dissent in Niang6° argued that the
definition of torture in the United Nations Convention Against
Torture ("CAT"),61 as well as dictionary definitions of torture,
99, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2008). But such a claim would only succeed if FGM, as practiced in
Senegal, involves multiple incidents of mutilation. Alternatively, at least in the Eighth
Circuit, Niang could have claimed general persecution as a woman based on the past FGM
harm she suffered. See Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) ("We have
never held that a petitioner must fear the repetition of the exact harm that she has
suffered in the past. Our definition of persecution is not that narrow.").
57. Niang, 492 F.3d at 512.
58. See, e.g., Gumanch v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2008) ("We conclude
that an applicant may not establish a derivative claim for withholding of removal based
upon the applicant's child's fear of persecution."); Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617
(7th Cir. 2003) ("[T]here is no statutory or regulatory authority for Oforji to have her own
deportation suspended because she fears for her children if they return to Nigeria with her
[and face FGM]."). The Abay holding, as previously discussed, conflicts with Niang, but it
is the only case that granted asylum to the parent based on the fear that FGM would be
performed on the daughter. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
60. Judge Williams concurred with the majority's denial of Niang's derivative
withholding of removal claim. Niang, 492 F.3d at 514 (Williams, J., dissenting in part).
But she dissented from the majority's denial of Niang's withholding claim based on the
psychological harm Niang would suffer if her daughter was subjected to FGM and would
have remanded to the BIA for a determination of the issue. Id. at 514-15, 520.
61. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, art. 1 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, 113 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
indicate torture may be solely psychological.62 Judge Williams used a
broad interpretation of the definitions of torture to argue that the
majority construed "persecution" too narrowly compared to BIA
interpretations and would have remanded to the BIA for a
determination of that issue.63 But a more complete look at the CAT
definition of torture belies Judge Williams' claim that a parent's
awareness of the persecution of a daughter could qualify as torture
under CAT. As the majority held, it was simply unnecessary to
remand the case to the BIA to determine if the psychological harm of
having a daughter subjected to FGM qualified as torture.6
The CAT defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.65
Judge Williams used just a small portion of this definition-defining
torture as an "act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person"-to support her
argument that psychological harm could qualify as persecution.66 Put
simply, Judge Williams argued that because torture may qualify as
statutory persecution and because torture includes psychological pain
and suffering, a logical conclusion could be drawn that psychological
harm may constitute persecution.67 Although Judge Williams argued
62. Niang, 492 F.3d at 516. This discussion of the Convention Against Torture to
support a claim of psychological persecution should be distinguished from Niang's claim
for asylum under CAT, which Niang waived when she did not appeal it to the Fourth
Circuit. Id. at 514 n.1. Judge Williams became Chief Judge Williams in July 2007, less
than a month after the Niang case was decided. See Jerry Markon & Michael D. Shear,
Conservatives' Grip on Key Virginia Court Is at Risk, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2006, at Al.
Since Judge Williams is listed as a Judge in the Niang opinion, this piece will refer to her
as Judge Williams.
63. See Niang, 492 F.3d at 516-17. Fears of torture can make an immigrant eligible
for withholding of removal under CAT. Hughes, supra note 8, at 307.
64. Niang, 492 F.3d at 514.
65. Convention Against Torture, supra note 61, at art. 1 (emphasis added).
66. Niang, 492 F.3d at 516 (Williams, J., dissenting in part).
67. Id.
1288 [Vol. 87
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that the majority views "persecution" too narrowly, under the
definition provided by the CAT, it seems that Judge Williams viewed
the term too broadly. All legal terms, including "torture," find some
portion of their meaning from context. It is undisputed that FGM
itself constitutes torture because of the physical and mental suffering
it inflicts.68 But as the conflicts between the circuit courts regarding
parents of potential FGM victims,6 9 and between Judge Williams and
the majority in Niang indicate, it is unsettled whether being a parent
of an FGM victim constitutes torture at all, much less torture to the
point of persecution.
The full definition of torture in the CAT supports a narrower
view than Judge Williams propounds, especially in the context of
Niang's claim. After defining "acts" that might constitute torture, the
CAT then describes "purposes" for which the acts will constitute
torture, including forcing confessions, punishment, and
interrogation,7" none of which support the premise that parents of
potential FGM victims suffer torture. Thus, it appears that Judge
Williams' broad view of torture is based on the fourth general
purpose for which acts constitute torture-the broad, vague provision
that acts constitute torture if they are committed "for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind" when imposed directly or
indirectly by a public official or someone acting in official capacity.71
But fitting parents of potential FGM victims into this definition
requires "the consent or acquiescence" of some public official72 or, at
a minimum, "willful blindness" of government officials.7 3 Including
such parents stretches the definition of torture beyond the breaking
point in cases such as Niang, where the government of Senegal has
criminalized FGM and has established educational programs and
individual villages have prohibited FGM.74
68. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005).
69. Compare Niang, 492 F.3d at 513, and Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617 (7th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting, in both cases, mothers' claims of derivative asylum or derivative
withholding of removal based on the threat of FGM to their U.S. citizen daughters), with
Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding mother had well-founded fear
of persecution to qualify as refugee based on the FGM threat to her daughter). The
conflict here tends to blend parents' claims of psychological persecution to support their
own asylum claims with claims of derivative asylum based on the threat to their children.
For a discussion relating to claims of derivative asylum, see infra Part IV.
70. Convention Against Torture, supra note 61, at art. 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2004).
74. Niang, 492 F.3d at 508-09 (citing 2003 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcTICES FOR SENEGAL (Feb. 25,2004)).
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Maintaining the integrity of the asylum process supports the
exclusion of parents of potential FGM victims from the "torture"
category and the rejection of claims that psychological harm qualifies
as persecution necessary for asylum or withholding of removal.
Determining that parents like Niang would suffer actual psychological
harm to the extent of torture in witnessing or being aware of FGM
being performed on their daughters requires a difficult journey into
the mind of the parent. The father of Niang's daughter, for example,
apparently supports (or at least does not oppose) the practice of
FGM.75 If he were faced with removal proceedings, it is not clear
whether he would testify to this fact, and he would certainly have a
strong incentive to maintain otherwise. If parents of potential FGM
victims were deemed to suffer persecution through an expansive view
of torture, parents who simply stated opposition to FGM and their
fear of it being performed upon their daughters would be able to
strongly anchor their claims for asylum and withholding of removal.
This could result in the realization of the Fourth Circuit's fear of
"wholesale circumvention of the immigration laws by persons who
enter the country illegally and promptly have children to avoid
deportation."76  The best policy is to reject the argument that the
possible psychological harm of having a daughter subjected to FGM
qualifies as torture sufficient to support a claim of persecution.
IV. REJECTING NIANG'S DERIVATIVE CLAIM FOR WITHHOLDING
OF REMOVAL
Niang's second argument on appeal was that the Fourth Circuit
should recognize a derivative claim for withholding of removal based
on the "barbaric nature of FGM."77  Such a claim had no clear
statutory basis and did not fit within the recognized exception for
hardship to U.S. citizen children and spouses, an exception that
requires a ten-year physical presence in the United States by the
asylum applicant.78 The Fourth Circuit majority held that the statute
75. Id. at 508.
76. Id. at 512 n.11 (quoting Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.
1980)).
77. Id. at 513. Note that this claim can easily be confused with Niang's claim of
psychological harm. While Niang's claim of psychological harm is based on the threat of
FGM to her daughter, it is directly based on the psychological harm she would suffer as a
parent. The derivative claim, on the other hand, is based directly on the harm that Niang's
daughter might suffer if she accompanied Niang to Senegal. For further discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
78. Niang, 492 F.3d at 513 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2000)); see also In re A-
K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 279 (B.I.A. 2007) ("[W]hile section 208(b)(3)(A) of the Act
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did not provide a derivative withholding claim like Niang's and
refused to create one.79 The Fourth Circuit's decision was followed
by the BIA when it decided In re A-K-, which reaffirmed the lack of
statutory authority to grant derivative asylum to a parent based on a
child's successful asylum claim.81
The BIA, like the Fourth Circuit and other circuits, seems
reluctant to establish derivative asylum or withholding claims for
parents of daughters facing FGM.82 This reluctance seems mainly
based on the lack of a statutory basis on which to ground such
claims,83 but could also be related to the experience of handling
derivative claims in the context of asylum for victims of China's harsh
population control measures. Currently, the legal definition of a
"refugee" in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) includes special language that
presumes persecution on account of political opinion for an asylum
applicant "who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program .... "I This special language is
a result of amendments to the law that were included in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,85
which addressed asylum claims that resulted from "coercive family
provides for derivative asylum in certain circumstances, the Act does not permit derivative
withholding of removal under any circumstances.").
79. Niang, 492 F.3d at 513.
80. 24 I. & N. Dec. 275,279 (B.I.A. 2007).
81. Id. Although In re A-K- focused on asylum status, the BIA also noted that
applicants for withholding of removal could not base their claims solely on the fear of
FGM being forced upon their daughters in the native country. Id. at 275. This decision
has been interpreted as "foreclosing" derivative claims and claims of psychological harm
made by parents based on the potential persecution of their children. See Kechichian v.
Mukasey, 535 F.3d 15, 22 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2008). Again, the claim of the parent's own
psychological harm as persecution is blending with the parent's derivative claim based on
harm to the child. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
82. See, e.g., Gumaneh v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 785, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2008) (agreeing
with the reasoning in Niang); Niang, 492 F.3d at 513; Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615
(7th Cir. 2003) ("It is important to understand that claims of constructive deportation
[(i.e., derivative asylum)] are cognizable only if such a claim falls squarely within the
narrow holdings of the cases creating the doctrine."). In Abay, the majority did not reach
the derivative asylum claim, focusing instead of the mother's fear that her daughter would
be subjected to FGM. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2004). Judge Sutton's
concurrence indicated that there was no statutory basis for such a derivative claim. Id. at
645 (Sutton, J., concurring).
83. See In re A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 279.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
85. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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planning practices" in the native country. s6 When the BIA decided In
re C-Y-Z-sT and interpreted this special language for the first time, it
held not only that an alien could claim asylum and withholding of
removal based on her forced abortion or sterilization, but also that
her husband could successfully make such claims based upon his
wife's suffering.8 Thus, this decision effectively found that an alien
was persecuted based on physical acts that were performed on his
spouse.89
In the Niang case, Judge Williams, in her dissent, raised the
precedent of C-Y-Z- to support the proposition that psychological
harm to the alien applicant based on the forced sterilization of his
wife could support a claim of persecution.9°  The claim of
psychological harm to support persecution and the claim for
derivative asylum or withholding begin to overlap in this area, as an
asylum applicant like Niang strives to find a way to remain in the
country. Although a legal difference exists between a claim for
derivative asylum and a claim of psychological harm,9 there does not
seem to be much substantive difference. In the derivative claim, the
applicant is claiming that the harm her daughter will suffer should
support a grant of asylum or withholding to her derivatively, while in
the psychological harm claim, the applicant is claiming that the harm
to her daughter causes her psychological harm, which is persecution
that qualifies her for asylum or withholding in her own right.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit rejected the view that harm to another
supported a claim of persecution by the asylum applicant, narrowly
reading C-Y-Z- to permit a derivative claim for asylum or withholding
only in cases of forced sterilization.92 As discussed in Part VI below,
86. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 917 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc).
87. Id. at 915.
88. Id. at 919-20.
89. Even at the time it was made, this decision was controversial, drawing two dissents
that argued that the husband did not suffer persecution because of the sterilization of his
wife. Id. at 933 (Vacca, Board Member, dissenting); id. at 935 (Villageliu, Board Member,
dissenting).
90. Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, J., dissenting in
part).
91. See id. at 509-10 (treating the psychological harm and "derivative" claims
separately).
92. Id. at 511 n.9. The statute prevented the Fourth Circuit from establishing a
derivative claim for withholding of removal. See In re A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 279
(B.I.A. 2007) ("[W]hile section 208(b)(3)(A) of the Act provides for derivative asylum in
certain circumstances, the Act does not permit derivative withholding of removal under
any circumstances.") (emphasis added).
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limiting derivative claims in this manner helps support the integrity of
the asylum system as a whole.
Even within the sterilization context, derivative claims have only
been allowed in the narrow situation of sterilization threats to
spouses. In the case of In re S-L-L-,93 a boyfriend attempted to claim
asylum, withholding, and CAT protection based on allegations that
the Chinese government had compelled the abortion of his child by
his girlfriend.94 Importantly, the BIA resolved the case by limiting the
holding of C-Y-Z-, permitting only spouses to establish past
persecution under the special language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) and
requiring unmarried applicants to prove any claims based on other
language in the provision.95 As the majority stated, "[t]he interpretive
lines, no matter where drawn, will be vulnerable to criticism that they
are overinclusive, under-inclusive, inadequately tied to statutory
language, or unmanageable in practice. 96
The S-L-L- decision helps to show the difficulties in application
that arose from the C-Y-Z- decision. The expansion of statutory
language by Congress and the subsequent interpretation of that
language by the BIA in C-Y-Z- required the courts and immigration
agencies to determine which applicants qualified for the derivative
claim permitted by the statutory amendment. The statutory
amendment itself has recently been reinterpreted, with the Second
Circuit holding that the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) do not
automatically apply to spouses,9 7 effectively reversing C-Y-Z- and S-
L-L-. These cases show the difficulties that could arise if a statutory
amendment was made to permit derivative claims for those related or
romantically involved with girls and women threatened by FGM.
Professor Karen Musalo has argued that there should be similar
treatment for FGM cases and forced sterilization cases.98 Musalo
argues that the only reason there is any distinction is that the judiciary
is dominated by men who value "procreation and motherhood,"
which are threatened by sterilization.99 FGM, on the other hand, is
not valued by the predominantly male judiciary because it only affects
93. 24 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2006).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 8. The other language in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) includes in the definition of
a "refugee" a person who has been persecuted "for other resistance to a coercive
population control program." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
96. In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 4.
97. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 311-12 (2d Cir. 2007).
98. Liptak, supra note 45 (quoting Professor Karen Musalo from a newspaper
interview).
99. Id.
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"women's sexual pleasure and autonomy. ''"" ° Despite Musalo's
interesting viewpoint, the law can be explained more simply:
targeting victims of coercive population measures for asylum
involves, for the most part, the pool of applicants facing forced
sterilizations and forced abortions in China.' Targeting victims of
FGM for asylum involves a much larger pool of applicants distributed
throughout Africa and parts of Asia.0 2 Limiting asylum claims to
those actually threatened with FGM helps the law avoid problematic
loopholes that might encourage alien mothers from a wide array of
nations to come to the United States to have children at least partly
for the purpose of avoiding removal.0 3 Thus, the experience with
special provisions for those suffering from coercive population
control measures indicates that the lack of expansion of derivative
claims to parents of potential FGM victims is a welcome stability in
the law.
V. NIANG V. GONZALES AS A STABILIZING INFLUENCE IN ASYLUM
LAW
As previously discussed in Parts II through IV of this Recent
Development, the Fourth Circuit correctly decided Niang v. Gonzales
as a matter of law. As a matter of policy, the Niang decision is also
appropriate. The precedential effect of the Fourth Circuit's decision
helps to stabilize a somewhat turbulent area of asylum law.
Moreover, as discussed below, the opinion best serves the ultimate
goals of asylum law.
Stability in the law surrounding grants of asylum and withholding
of removal for parents of potential FGM victims provides potential
100. Id.
101. See Carrie Acus Love, Note, Unrepeatable Harms: Female Genital Mutilation and
Involuntary Sterilization in U.S. Asylum Law, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 215 &
n.213 (2008) (noting that the Congressional amendments to the definition of a "refugee"
in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) were aimed at Chinese immigrants). Victims of forced
sterilization or abortion in other nations also seem eligible to apply for asylum under the
provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). For example, reports indicate that Romani women
living in Slovakia have been forcibly sterilized, and thus the language of § 1101(a)(42)
appears to apply to them as well. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., BODY AND SOUL:
FORCED STERILIZATION AND OTHER ASSAULTS ON ROMA REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
IN SLOVAKIA 31 (2003), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/bo_slov-partl_0.pdf.
102. See Blizzard, supra note 19, at 901.
103. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Under the present law a
woman who is otherwise a deportable alien does not have any incentive to bear a child
(who automatically becomes a citizen) whose rights to stay are separate from the mother's
obligation to depart.").
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asylees with a clear expectation about their ability to stay in the
United States. This is especially important in the immigration courts,
where clear precedent is lacking."°  Under administrative law
precedent, the circuit courts defer to the BIA's interpretations of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and related regulations. 105 But with
a limited number of reported decisions from the BIA, °6 every case
decided by the circuit courts on appeal becomes much more valuable
for its ability to clarify the law for potential asylees and asylum law
practitioners.
Denying alien parents' claims for relief from removal when their
daughters are threatened with FGM also serves the ultimate goals of
asylum law. David Martin describes the two competing goals of
asylum law as a desire to "provide haven for the persecuted" and a
desire to have "reasonable control over the entry of aliens.""1 7 The
easier it is for aliens to successfully claim asylum or withholding of
removal in a nation, the more aliens will come to that nation, leading
to a political "backlash" because the desire for reasonable control has
not been satisfied. 8 In the case of FGM, expanding the legal
definition of persecution to include pure psychological harm or
permitting some form of derivative claim would undoubtedly expand
the possibilities for asylum. Because doing so would threaten the
scarce resource of asylum,0 9 "courts and agencies must resist the
104. Robert C. Leitner, Comment, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration
Adjudicatory System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679,
681 (2004) ("[There is a] marked lack of precedent ... generated by the immigration
courts. While the hallmark of the common law system is the respect for precedent and
stare decisis, few, if any, of the decisions that emerge from the immigration courts are
published, and these decisions therefore carry minimal precedential value."). Leitner also
notes that the courts of appeals have split on several immigration issues, which the
Supreme Court has been slow to resolve. Id.
105. Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, J., dissenting in
part) (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) and Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984)).
106. See Leitner, supra note 104, at 681.
107. David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful
Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 30,
34 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991).
108. Id. at 35.
109. Asylum is a scarce resource because there is, in practice, an upper limit to the
number of refugees the United States accepts each year. While the Citizenship and
Immigration Service of the Department of Homeland Security states on its webpage that
"[t]here are no quotas on the number of individuals who may be granted asylum each
year," U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Dep't of Homeland Sec., Asylum,
www.uscis.gov/asylum (last visited Apr. 13, 2009), there is a statutory requirement for the
President to provide a limit on the number of refugees for each fiscal year after
consultation with Congress. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 207(a)(2), (d), 8
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temptation to expand the legal standards governing asylum"'1 ° as they
pertain to parents whose daughters are threatened with FGM.
Legal scholars have identified this argument as the "floodgates"
or "slippery slope" argument-that a precedential grant of asylum in
one case will result in massive amounts of immigration and asylum
claims based on that precedent.111 Professor Musalo notes that this
argument is used to urge denial of asylum to women that suffer,
among other abuses, FGM."2 It is important to distinguish the grant
of asylum or withholding for those women and girls that face FGM
themselves, who can currently make successful asylum claims, from
the parents or spouses of these potential FGM victims. 3
Legally permitting claims by parents of potential FGM victims,
whether based on pure psychological harm, the CAT, or some form
of derivative claim, would increase the risk that parents from areas
where FGM is prevalent would come to the United States and have
children to avoid removal." 4 It is certainly possible that the increase
U.S.C. §§ 1157(a)(2), (d) (2006). For fiscal year 2008, the proposed limit was 80,000
refugees. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2008: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 18 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/91978.pdf.
110. Martin, supra note 107, at 37.
111. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of
Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 119, 120 (2007)
(discussing the "floodgates" argument and noting that granting asylum will result in a
"deluge of claims"); Amy B. Kretkowski, Note, Continuing Persecution: An Argument for
Doctrinal Codification in Light of In re A-T- and Brand X, 94 IOWA L. REV. 331, 366
(2008) (discussing the "slippery slope" argument and noting fear of "mass immigration"
held by the government and the BIA).
112. Musalo, supra note 111, at 119-20. Musalo argues that the floodgates argument as
it relates to gender-related harms does not have an empirical basis. See id. at 132-33. This
Recent Development does not dispute that claim, as it focuses on the claims of parents of
potential FGM victims, not those of women and girls actually threatened with FGM.
113. See supra note 4, for example.
114. Recent statistics describing the United States' unauthorized immigrant population
in general (i.e., not specifically describing the population of parents of potential FGM
victims) support the view that immigrants come to the United States and have children.
See THE URBAN INST., CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (May 2006),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900955 Children of Immigrants.pdf (noting that in
2003, sixty-one percent of children of immigrants lived in a family with at least one
noncitizen parent). Children born in the United States are U.S. citizens. Id. When
immigrating, the soon-to-be parents of these citizen children disregard the possibility that
they will eventually be deported and separated from their children. See Nina Bernstein, A
Mother Deported, and a Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at Al (noting that
immigration experts estimate that tens of thousands of U.S. citizen children annually lose
unauthorized immigrant parents to deportation). Thus, even without the possibility of
being granted asylum or withholding of removal and with the danger of being separated
from their citizen children, parents come to the United States and have children. This
author asserts that the granting of asylum claims to parents of potential FGM victims
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in successful claims would not directly result in a drastic increase in
the overall number of grants of asylum and withholding of removal.
Nevertheless, granting such claims would increase the risk that
parents from areas where FGM is prevalent would come to the
United States and have children partly to avoid deportation."5 The
concern is not about the increased "flow" of immigrants, but rather
about the type of immigrant who is coming (i.e., the immigrant who
comes to the United States and has a child to avoid deportation).
Grants of asylum and withholding of removal should be reserved for
those who truly face persecution-not uncertain psychological
harm-in their home countries.
Additionally, denying alien parents' claims for asylum or
withholding of removal may ultimately reduce the occurrence of
FGM worldwide. If more parents are granted asylum or withholding
based on threats of FGM, perhaps fewer people will protest the
practice of FGM in nations where it is prevalent. Once granted
asylum or withholding, parents who might have protested FGM seem
to have little personal incentive to do so because they and their
children are safely in the United States. Even if these parents were to
protest from the United States, it seems likely that their protests
would be ineffective because communities that practice FGM
generally seem to ignore attempts by "outsiders" to educate them."6
A lack of significant protest and community conflict over FGM in
foreign nations will reinforce its practice. It may seem more humane
to allow alien parents to stay with their daughters in the United States
and avoid social ostracization for refusing to have FGM performed on
their daughters or, alternatively, avoid the psychological harm caused
by the actual practice. However, from a broader viewpoint, the more
humane approach is to not allow alien parents to flee social conflict in
their home nations, in effect, "turning their backs on continuing the
struggle for a communal answer""' 7 to the practice of FGM.
would only increase the incentive for these parents to come to the United States and have
children. It should be noted, however, that the total number of parents making claims, if
anything like the total number of FGM victims claiming asylum or withholding of removal,
is likely to be small. See Zainab Zakari, FGM Asylum Cases Forge New Legal Standing,
WOMEN'S E-NEWS, Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=3833
(noting that although it is difficult to reliably estimate FGM-related asylum grants, the
overall number of girls and women seeking FGM-related asylum has typically been small).
115. See supra note 17 and text accompanying note 103.
116. See Patricia A. Broussard, Female Genital Mutilation: Exploring Strategies for
Ending Ritualized Torture; Shaming, Blaming, and Utilizing the Convention Against
Torture, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 19, 37 (2008).
117. Martin, supra note 107, at 44 (speaking generally about the conflict between
grants of asylum and global human rights efforts).
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Some implicitly reject this argument when advocating for
changes to U.S. immigration law that would grant parents asylum or
withholding and thus prevent those parents from having to choose
between abandoning their citizen children or exposing their daughters
to the threat of FGM in the native country." 8 This focus on
preserving the family recognizes the fact that parents of potential
FGM victims may not initially possess the power to effectuate change
in their home countries or to fully protect their children."9 But this
argument fails to recognize that the most successful programs to
reduce FGM involve education of the community by its members-
not by outsiders or foreigners.'20 Depriving a community of the
parents that resist FGM will only serve to perpetuate the practice. If
parents truly oppose FGM, they should use their resources and fight
to change its practice in their native countries, rather than wasting
their resources traveling to the United States and attempting to
abandon the communal struggle.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's response to the difficult case of Niang v.
Gonzales was appropriate based on current asylum law. As it is
currently implemented by courts and immigration agencies, asylum
law functions properly to meet the needs of those aliens truly in need
of the protection of the United States. Pure psychological harm that
a parent experiences when her daughter undergoes FGM is too
tenuous to support an asylum or withholding of removal claim based
on persecution or the United Nations Convention Against Torture.
Derivative claims of asylum or withholding are appropriately limited
to claims made by victims of China's coercive population control
methods, and, as the difficulties experienced in that setting indicate,
should not be expanded to include claims made by parents of
118. See Blizzard, supra note 19, at 925-26; Dree K. Collopy, Note, Incorporating a
Hardship Factor in Asylum Claims Based on Female Genital Mutilation: A Legislative
Solution to Protect the Best Interests of Children, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 469,503 (2007).
119. See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that
parents may sometimes be unable to prevent FGM from being forcibly performed on their
daughter by other relatives); Tiffany Ballenger, Female Genital Mutilation: Legal and
Non-Legal Approaches to Eradication, 9 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 84, 88 (2008) (noting
that families who oppose FGM may be shunned by their community and that daughters
who have not undergone FGM may be unable to marry); Musalo, supra note 111, at 133
(noting that female asylum seekers may have few financial assets).
120. See Ballenger, supra note 119, at 92-93; see also Broussard, supra note 116, at 37-
39 (arguing that support for native educators and the resulting self-actualization will
reduce the practice of FGM).
1298 [Vol. 87
NIANG v. GONZALES
potential FGM victims. Because it ultimately encourages those who
oppose FGM to stand up for their beliefs and catalyze community
change, the current denial of asylum or withholding to parents of
daughters facing FGM is appropriate as a matter of humanitarian
policy. FGM threats to daughters should not be a basis for parents to
be granted asylum or any other form of relief from removal.
DANIEL F. E. SMITH**
** I am very grateful to my primary editor, Kelly O'Connell, for her helpful comments
and thoughtful criticism.
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